It is sometimes assumed that there is a special exclamative semantics, in particular, that some wh clauses have an exclamative semantics even when embedded, maybe beside an interrogative semantics. In this paper I investigate what such an exclamative semantics might consist in, arguing that there are indeed different readings of wh clauses involved, but that these nuances do not concern the meaning type common to exclamatives and interrogatives: a function assigning to any world a true proposition.
Introduction
Clauses used as exclamations often coincide formally with embedded clauses, in particular, embedded wh clauses, like the German was 'what', wer 'who', or wie 'how' clauses in (1)-(3). a. Ich sehe es noch vor mir, wie er den Ball um die Mauer zirkelt. 'I can still visualize the way he bent the ball round the wall.' b. Wie er den Ball um die Mauer zirkelt! It is prima facie natural, then, to assume a uniform meaning for these clauses irrespectively of whether they are embedded or used as exclamations. Indeed, an assumption that clauses used as exclamations denote true propositions, as do wh clauses according to Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) , is attractive. Propositions known to be true are uninformative, so the clauses cannot be used as assertions; by the same token, however, they are well suited to serve as exclamations: if, as seems reasonable, the point of exclamations is to communicate that something is, at a minimum, remarkable, i.e., a factive propositional attitude, then a true proposition, a fact, is just what this speech act requires.
If clauses used as exclamations denote true propositions, one would expect that not just wh clauses but also that clauses can be used as exclamations, provided that the propositions they denote count as true in the situation of utterance, and this expectation is borne out (at least in regard to German):
Dass du dich daran noch erinnerst! 'that you still remember that'
The parallel between exclamatives and interrogatives has been noted by many. Let us formulate the hypothesis that wh sentences used as exclamations denote true propositions -assuming the theory of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) -or sets of true propositions -assuming the theory of Karttunen (1977) -precisely:
The compositionally derived intension of a wh clause used as an exclamation assigns to any world a proposition true in that world, or a set of propositions true in that world.
Certain facts might seem to cast doubt on this hypothesis:
1. Some wh clauses cannot or can barely be used as exclamations ( (6)).
2. Some wh clauses that can serve as exclamations can barely be embedded.
3. Some wh clauses that can serve as exclamations cannot be embedded under verbs like ask or wonder or, suitably transformed, used as questions ( (8)).
(6) #Which ship her brother was lost from! These facts can be taken to indicate the existence of semantic properties peculiar to "exclamatives", i.e. clauses used as exclamations. They may seem to motivate the assumption that the meaning of exclamatives involves something different from or more than the meaning of superficially equal or similar interrogatives.
Several proposals have been made in this direction. Especially relevant to Fact 1 is the assumption, variously formulated, that exclamatives crucially involve degrees and scales (Miró 2007 , Rett 2008 , Zanuttini and Portner 2003 . Fact 2 would go to show that certain (variants of certain) wh words (as also certain equative adverbs and subjunctions like Norwegian så, som) signal exclamations in a similar way as direct question word order and intonation signal questions (Beyssade and Marandin 2006: 50) . None of this is necessarily at odds with (5).
To meet the challenge from Fact 3, it is natural to assume, following Zanuttini and Portner (2003) , that exclamatives are inherently factive in the strong sense that they presuppose themselves; the sentences could only be felicitously used if the denoted propositions follow from the Common Ground. Such sentences are useless as questions because the answers are already given.
Yet there are problems with Fact 3 and those wh clauses that can be embedded under many predicates but not, suitably transformed, used for asking questions. One problem concerns wh clauses like (9a), which can be used as exclamations but not as questions, though they can be embedded under predicates like know :
a. how very long the Nile is b. #How very long is the Nile? c. Jane knows how very long the Nile is.
A presupposition to the effect that (9b) presupposes its own true answer must be triggered by something, and the only trigger candidate is the adverb very, yet it is not plausible that this word should encode such a presupposition. Zanuttini and Portner (2003) suggest that the obligatory exclamative nature of how very phrases is marked by an additional element, lexicalized as very, and that in a case like (9c), the denotation of the embedded exclamative (9a) is computed with respect to two domains, D1 and D2, each a set of lengths, where D2 is the result of widening D1, as if the embedded exclamative were a root exclamative; D1 reflects the 'expected' values while D2 also contains more extreme values, presupposed to be true of the length of the Nile.
Thus the word very, in combination with how , induces widening and factivity, the two interpretive characteristics of exclamations in this theory, but it does not do so by virtue of its ordinary meaning; very is seen as ambiguous between an "E-only marker" and an "ordinary modifier". Still, it is desirable to assume just one very, seeking the source of the infelicity of (9b) in the meaning of (9a). But in fact, it is unclear how this meaning is built: on existing analyses of very, this adverb yields predicates, whereas how needs a measure function. Besides, the analysis must predict that (9c) presupposes that the Nile is very long. So:
-What is the meaning of how very long and how is this meaning built?
-How does the presupposition that . . . is very long come about?
-What accounts for the infelicity of the how very long question?
Another problem concerns clauses like (10a), with roughly the same distribution as the how very (enormously, extremely, . . . ) clauses:
(10) a. what a long river the Nile is b. #What a long river is the Nile? c. Jane knows what a long river the Nile is.
A presupposition to the effect that (10b) presupposes its own true answer could be anchored to the adverb what , so the infelicitous question is not the problem. Rather, the problem concerns, again, the compositional semantics: the wh word what would seem to act as a degree adverb, but at the same time to operate on an NP; this is particularly apparent in cases like (11), without an adjective:
Jane knows what a diva Justin Timberlake is.
The case is similar for clauses where how acts as a degree adverb without any adverb: the wh clause in (12) is ambiguous between a degree and a mode reading, but if it is used as a question, the former is not preserved. The degree adverb interpretation of how seems difficult to reconcile with the type of its argument.
(12) God alone knows how she has suffered over the years.
According to Grimshaw (1979) and Elliott (1974) , the wh clauses in (9c), (10c), (11) and (12) are embedded exclamatives, and the wh clause in (13) can be an embedded exclamative or an embedded interrogative; it ought to be ambiguous.
(13) Jane knows how long the Nile is.
On this view, even ordinary degree wh clauses -how + A -would have a reading that is not available if the clause is used as a question.
Grimshaw held that (14) is indeed ambiguous and that the two readings can be separated by considering scenarios like (15a-b) and paraphrases like (16a-b):
John knows how tall that building is.
(15) a. John asked the height of that building. b. John couldn't believe the height of that building.
(16) a. John knows what the height of that building is. b. John knows that that building is notably (significantly) high.
Our intuitions may not be so clear here. But anyway, as long as we do not know what it means to be notably high, the exclamative reading remains elusive.
Summing up, we do not know for sure what (9c), (10c), (11), (12) (on the degree reading) or (13) (on the alleged exclamative reading) mean, and as long as we do not, these clauses and readings may well pose a threat to our hypothesis (5). The same can be said about clauses that cannot be embedded under anything or used as questions (Fact 2), but clauses that can be embedded under predicates like know are easier to study because the sentences where they are embedded have determinate truth conditions. The question is what those are, and, if (13) and (14) are truly ambiguous, what the "exclamative" interpretation is.
We do have a fair idea what the wh clause in (13) denotes on the interrogative reading: (17) (Karttunen 1977 style) or (18) (Groenendijk -Stokhof 1982 style) (φ is a proposition, δ is a degree, w is a possible world, v is the actual world):
Henceforth I will concentrate on the Groenendijk and Stokhof theory, mostly because it immediately predicts that any complement of predicates like know denotes a proposition, but also because given (5), reducing to (19), it predicts that a wh clause provides the exclamation speech act with a proposition.
(19)
THE EXCLAMATIVE-INTERROGATIVE CONNECTION (EIC2)
The compositionally derived intension of a wh clause used as an exclamation assigns to any world a proposition true in that world.
The goal of the paper is rather restricted: simply to defend (19), or at least, the weaker version (5), in the face of putative counterevidence, mainly coming from 'exclamative-only' locutions. In so doing, I am not defending or attacking any particular theory of exclamatives or exclamations; especially (5) Recall that we need to find answers to the following questions:
These questions are addressed in successive subsections.
Building "how very A": A Split Positive
The first thing to note is that existing descriptions of very etc. make these degree adverbs operate on measure functions or on predicates to produce predicates. This is natural; after all, degree modifiers normally cooccur with the positive. But precisely because they output predicates, they bar the degree adverb how from applying to the result, for how itself needs a measure function; normally, it cooccurs with and applies to an adjective or adverb stem.
I cite the analysis proposed by Katz (2005) ; the analyses proposed, in different forms, by Klein (1980) , Kennedy and McNally (2005) , and Barker (2002) differ in the type of the argument of the very function but not in the type of the value: a predicate.
The Semantics of very according to Katz (2005: 187) :
This should be compared to Kennedy's (2007) theory of the positive as a covert formative severed from the adjective stem (d
The Semantics of pos according to Kennedy (2007: 17) :
Here s is a context-sensitive function from measure functions to degrees that returns a standard of comparison based on properties of the adjective g and on features of the context of utterance, "in such a way as to ensure that the objects that the positive form is true of 'stand out' in the context of utterance, relative to the kind of measurement that the adjective encodes" (Kennedy 2007: 17) . Katz' definition of very incorporates such a relation to the standard of comparison, predicting that very and pos are in complementary distribution.
In the framework of the interrogative theory of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) , the wh degree adverb how might denote (23):
Here m is a measure function, normally coming from an adjective stem, x is an individual, j is a world, and i is the actual world. For how to apply to very . . . , very must both take and give a measure function, that is, degree adverbs like very must modify measure functions. One way to make very modify a measure function is to make it systematically diminish the measure: if m is the input, the output is λx m i (x)−v where v is the -very vague and context relativemeasure associated with this adverb: (24) very
If this output is fed to the positive formativeà la Kennedy (2007) , a sentence like (26) gets the reasonably sensible interpretation that the length of the Nile exceeds the standard length even after a factor v has been subtracted from it. (25) pos
The Nile is very long.
(27)
However, for (28), one cannot yet derive the presupposition that the Nile is very long; in fact, very is redundant, since the proposition Jane is to know is (29): (28) Jane knows how very long the Nile is.
how very long the Nile is (29) may be a possible interpretation of (30), but it is hardly the intended one. Rather, what one knows if one knows (30) is not the absolute length of the Nile but its length relative to the standard of comparison -how much (and it is very much) the absolute length exceeds the standard length.
One way to capture this intuition is to retain the definition of very in (24) (25) partially: it introduces the difference between the absolute measure and the standard of comparison, but the greater-than relation must be encoded in a 'higher positive' formative stating that the measure it applies to is (literally) positive:
The true positive (the Nile is long) will involve both the lower and the higher functor, pos 0 and pos 1 , but the how (very) context will only involve the former. It is important to note at once that there is independent evidence for introducing this complexity, evidence to which I will return in a moment.
Note that the lower positive defined in (31) may return a negative number for the difference between observed and standard measure; in this way, there can be measures falling short of the higher positive defined in (32), so that a sentence like the Nile is long can be false. Note, too, that if, as Kennedy (2007) argues, the standard for adjectives like clean or full is a maximum, the > relation in (32) should be replaced by ≥, used by Kennedy in his definition of the positive, so that a sentence like the barrel is full can be true.
Fitting the pieces together, the denotations I propose for the relevant words and functors are:
And the semantic composition of "how very long the Nile (is)", (30), is:
According to this, to know how very long the Nile is is to correctly believe that the difference between the length of the Nile and the standard of comparison enhanced by the v measure (v for very) is as great as it actually is. This is a plausible interpretation, and the key element in the analysis is that the positive is split in two halves where the lower half introduces the difference from the standard of comparison without stating that it be greater than zero.
Importantly, this novel element is independently motivated. The degree adverb, very or another, is of course omissible, so it is predicted that ordinary degree wh clauses can involve pos 0 as well. Strong evidence for this comes from a class of contexts which threaten to be tautologous on a standard analysis: degree wh clauses where the subject is an absolute measure, as in (33) and (34).
(33) I heard my brother's voice (the mountaineer) before my trip asking me "Tricia, do you have any idea how high 19.000 feet is?" and my response "I know exactly how high it is!" Ah, the arrogance of the inexperienced climber! I now realized he was right -I had no idea what 19.000 feet felt like, until now.
(34) Maybe you don't know how fast 50 seconds is.
On a standard analysis, not relating the measure to the comparison standard, (35a) is ascribed the interpretation (35b).
(35) a. how high 19.000 feet is b. λj height j (19.000 ft) = height i (19.000 ft)
And this is a tautology, because the height of 19.000 ft is constant, it could not vary from one world i to another world j.
While absolute measures are world-independent, comparison standards are not. This is evident from locutions like (36).
(36) In America my farm would be small. Therefore, the problem disappears once pos 0 is interpolated, resulting in the interpretation (35c).
This is a synthetic content and also a plausible interpretation of (35a). To know how high 19.000 ft. is amounts to correctly believing that the difference between 19.000 ft. and the standard of comparison is as great as it actually is. This is the only sensible interpretation of degree wh clauses where the subject is an absolute measure, but the relative interpretation involving pos 0 is possible when the subject is not an absolute measure, so that the relevant measure is world-dependent, as well. Indeed, since pos 0 is omissible, any degree wh clause is predicted to be ambiguous along this axis: it must be possible to know how long the Nile is without pos 0 -absolutely -without knowing how long it is with pos 0 -relatively; it must not be contradictory that Jane knows that the Nile is such and such long, yet she does not know how long it is.
As far as asking, not knowing, is concerned, Quine would disagree:
Asking after the thing in itself, apart from human conceptualization, is like asking how long the Nile really is, apart from our parochial miles or kilometers. (Quine 1993: 113) But it does seem possible to know a measure in the first, absolute sense without knowing it in the second, relative sense. To know wh . . . in the first sense but not in the second sense amounts to not knowing the standard of comparisonhaving no or a false belief about it. This is witnessed by the following examples.
(36) She knew the jump was long, and she knew it measured 5.70 m, but she didn't know how long it was until the end of the competition.
(37) I didn't realize how much time I used to have until I had James.
(38) She didn't realize how far it was, although she knew it was 40 km and she knew it was far; what she failed to realize was that in those conditions, her threshold for getting tired was at 20 km, not at 30 km. This is one way that Grimshaw's claim that (14) has an exclamative beside an interrogative reading can be made precise. I return to this issue in Section 4.
Additional motivation for introducing a split between differential measurement (pos 0 ) and inequality (pos 1 ) might come from the phenomenon that Kennedy (2001: 42) This sentence can have either the 'standard' interpretation (which is false) or the COD interpretation paraphrased as:
The degree to which the Sears Tower exceeds a standard of tallness (for buildings) is at least as great as the degree to which the San Francisco Bay Bridge exceeds a standard of length (for bridges). (Kennedy 2001: 43) Kennedy concludes that "it must be the case that comparison of deviation interpretations represent a freely available option in comparatives". His analysis involves "differential degrees", intervals corresponding to, e.g., the length of the San Francisco Bay Bridge subtracted by the standard length. The current proposal, severing the standard differential (pos 0 ) from the positive proper (pos 1 ), can be seen as a way to build a compositional account of comparison of deviation interpretations generally.
So although it may seem dangerous to introduce another optional covert formative like pos 0 , the ambiguities introduced along with it are attested in a wider domain than just degree wh clauses. A full survey of the possible consequences would, however, go beyond the scope of this paper.
The Presupposition
What accounts for the presupposition carried by (28) that the Nile is very long?
(28) Jane knows how very long the Nile is.
Rett (2008a) introduces an optional, covert degree modifier eval resulting in (39), to be compared with (17) as the interpretation of (13):
On Rett's analysis, (13) may mean that Jane knows (17) or that she knows (39), the degree to which the Nile is long and that it is long relative to the standard. Correspondingly, (28) may mean that Jane knows the degree to which the Nile is long and that it is very long relative to the standard. But this seems too weak: (36) or (38) come out as contradictory and (34) comes out as equivalent to (40): (40) Maybe you don't know that 50 seconds is fast.
But reconsider now the interpretation proposed above for (30), (41):
Note that the proposition that the Nile is very long arguably corresponds to the existential presupposition commonly associated with wh questions: that there is a nonvacuous answer, that is, that the relevant set is nonempty; in this case, that the measure is positive, m(x) > 0, spelt out as (42):
The presupposition to be accounted for thus corresponds to the presupposition often accompanying wh questions. Often, that is, not always; many scholars, notably Stokhof (1997: 1120) , have cited counterexamples and warned that the alleged presupposition is labile. However, note that without it, the degree adverb, very or one of its alternatives, would be totally redundant.
As far as the assertion is concerned, it is indeed redundant, as is evident from (41): The length and the standard may be world-dependent, but the adverb measure (v) is not, so it can safely be cancelled on both sides of the equation.
Once the putative presupposition is taken into consideration, however, very etc. make a difference after all, causing what is presupposed if something is in fact presupposed to be not merely that the Nile is long but that it is very long; and because the only reason there can be for uttering the adverb is to modify the presupposition, the presupposition is in fact communicated.
The Ban on Questions
What accounts for the fact that how very clauses cannot be questions?
(43) #How very long is the Nile?
We have seen that if (30) Now consider what such an answer can look like. The first thing to note is that although it is theoretically possible, it is not appropriate to answer a question about the difference between the relevant measure and the relevant comparison standard by specifying a measure. Because it is difficult to isolate the relative interpretation of a question like (46), it is useful to consider what would be natural answers to questions involving absolute measures, like (48).
(48) How high is 19.000 feet?
It is inappropriate to answer "4.000 ft. (higher than the comparison standard)", and the reason is presumably that a contextual standard is too vague to form a basis for measurement (as if one were to say of a collection of sand grains that to form a heap, it would need to grow by such and such a number of grains). Rather, appropriate answers will be vague and often circumspect, like:
-very, enormously, extremely, etc.;
-high enough to . . . / too high to . . . ; so high that . . .
The first class consists of vague degree adverbs like those under discussion here, the second consists of modal adjuncts of the kinds analyzed by Meier (2003) .
The key observation is that such an answer is already given in the very question by virtue of the presupposition, in (43) , that the Nile is very long, so in a sense, how very interrogatives will presuppose their own answers, thus falling prey to the restriction formulated by d'Avis (2001: 67): "Wh-clauses that presuppose their own answer cannot occur in question contexts." 2 Interestingly, however, the ban on intensified degree questions is not absolute. Abels (2007) cites some felicitous German cases (displaying the adverb enorm).
Here the context contains some alternative to the measure under consideration. For instance, the length of something is established and it is established that it is long; then attention shifts to something longer, and one can meaningfully ask: How very long is that then? (49) There is evidently something about this situation of utterance that saves this intensified question from presupposing its own answer and thus from infelicity. To me, the essential feature seems to be that the standard of comparison counts as given, in the Common Ground, so that it does not vary from one world to the other. In that case, the meaning of the question is not (50) but (51), which reduces to (52), a question about the measure in the absolute sense.
(50) λi λj age j (f) − (S j (age)+v) = age i (f) − (S i (age)+v) = λi λj age j (f)−S j (age) = age i (f)−S i (age) (51) λi λj age j (f)−S j (age) = age i (f)−S j (age) (52) λi λj age j (f) = age i (f)
A natural continuation of (49) would be (53), and such an answer is not already given by virtue of the presupposition that the father is enormously old: 
Building "What a (A) N": ∆, the Inverse Positive
There are basically two possible approaches to these phenomena. One is to posit a covert gradable adjective or adverb which is determined by the noun or verb it modifies or by the context, and let the wh functor operate on that adjective or adverb in the usual way, the way that how operates on adjectives or adverbs. The other possible approach is to take the constructions at face value and say that the wh functor operates on NPs or VPs, properties of individuals or events, and measures the degree to which these properties hold of individuals or events.
The first approach, taken by, inter alia, Castroviejo-Miró (2006), is problematic for two interrelated reasons:
First, there are limits to the use of the wh word without any adjective or adverb:
The noun or verb must have the potential for a scalar interpretation. (65) is odd because the river property is not inherently gradable.
While (66) is meaningful, it is not, as are (61)- (63), ambiguous between a scalar and a mode reading; it only has a mode reading. To predict this constraint on the hypothesis that there is a covert adjective or adverb, it seems necessary to require that this covert adjective or adverb be uniquely determined by the noun or verb, in other words, that there be a partial function mapping a noun or verb to its associated adjective or adverb; in this way, the adjective or adverb would not add information, it would effectively be synonymous to the noun or verb, in which case there would be no gain in positing it.
Second, the adjectives or adverbs that can modify the inherently gradable nouns or verbs overtly, like huge in (58), big in (59), or badly in (63), do not seem to denote measure functions at all, but rather properties of measure functions, as if they were intensifiers like very etc.; at any rate they are far from synonymous to the nouns or verbs they modify. So on the hypothesis that a covert adjective or adverb is there, this must at least in some cases be different from the overt adjective or adverb; and this is theoretically and descriptively problematic.
Thus I will take the second approach to the phenomenon under consideration, building on the intuition that, say, (55) means that I learnt to what extent the law is a long process, and, an affirmative answer to (61) means that I remember to what extent it rained last week. More exactly, I assume that the wh functor takes properties of individuals or events and treats them as measure functions, furthermore, that the nouns and verbs in (57)- (64) are born measure functions, as if they were adjectives, and become properties through a positive formative.
In particular, the "what" at work here (labelled what 3 to distinguish it from pronominal what 1 and what 2 meaning the same as which) is assumed to incorporate a mapping from properties to measure functions:
(69) ∆(P ) j (x) reads 'the degree to which x is P in j'.
The same format can be used for inherently gradable event properties (the how under consideration here is labelled how 3 to distinguish it from the mode wh adverb how 1 and the ordinary degree wh adverb how 2 ):
(71) ∆(Q) j (e) reads 'the degree to which e is Q in j'.
As noted above, ∆ must be a partial function -not all properties can be turned into measure functions; they must have the capacity for a scalar interpretation. All NPs consisting of a noun and an adjective express properties that have this capacity by virtue of the adjective, but bare nouns must be inherently gradable.
One way to model this is to decompose the noun and say that the property is in turn based on a measure function -it is born one and only becomes a property in the course of prelexical derivation, through positive formation.
3
This is illustrated in the below semantic composition tree for the clause (72).
4
Some nouns born measure functions may seem to involve, in Kennedy's (2007) term, 'lower closed scales', as do adjectives like dirty or bent , so that (a relative) 0 counts as the standard of comparison. For this reason, the tree does not include a pos 0 introducing a separate standard S in a merge with the noun-to-be diva. This assumption is not essential, however; there could well be that extra level at the bottom right and a −S i (diva) operation propelled upward.
The adjective big is treated as a measure function modifier, i.e., an intensifier. In the second merge, pos 1 turns the modified measure function into a property, and in the third, what 3 takes this to a function from entities to propositions.
(72) what a big diva Justin Timberlake is
The effect of the intensifier big (or, as the case may be, great etc.) is, just like the effect of very etc., to force a presupposition, here, that Justin is a big diva, because that is the only way it can escape redundancy. But in other contexts, these degree modifiers will have a clear effect on truth conditions, of course, as in ordinary positive statements like Justin is a big diva.
The definedness condition and the content of ∆ (as applied to properties) can be made precise in this way (em is the type of measure functions):
is only defined for properties P such that there is a unique measure function m such that P = λiλx m i (x) > 0; then ∆(P ) = m.
Thus ∆ and pos 1 ′ are inverse functions: ∆(pos 1 ′ (m)) = m, and for any noun (or verb) Q inherently gradable in the sense that it is born a measure function, if its adjectival root form (in the terminology of Distributed Morphology) is A, what a Q you are denotes λj A ′ j (you) = A ′ i (you). In consequence, the top line of the above tree for (72) reduces to λj diva
With (68), (73), and the interpretation of many nouns as born adjectives and some adjectives as (sometimes) born degree modifiers, I invoke a considerable machinery to construct a compositional description of degree what (a) clauses. It may appear costly and risky to do so. However, part of that machinery -or something similar -must be invoked anyway to account for the properties of those nouns and adjectives independently of what clauses. Admittedly, though, the discussion of these properties and the proposed analysis must in the framework of the present paper remain somewhat tentative and sketchy.
Many inherently gradable nouns are metaphors, predicates of 'personal taste' (Lasersohn 2005 (Lasersohn , 2007 , or words carrying an 'expressive meaning' (Potts 2007) . It is perhaps not implausible that such N items should start life as adjectives; however, needless to say, these issues are in need of further research.
The Ban on Questions
It is impossible to use a what a clause to ask a question, or to embed one under ask or wonder .
(74) #What a (great) friend is she?
(75) #What a large city is Baghdad?
One cannot argue here that the question answers itself by virtue of its semantics, as in the case of how very. One could try to argue that it is difficult to answer a question like (74); but on the other hand, it is possible to ask a question like (76), and the meaning seems to be much the same:
How great a friend is she?
It may be difficult to answer such a question, but it is evidently not impossible. However, since the wh word what must be ascribed a special meaning anyway, it is possible, as suggested in Section 1, to define a presupposition consisting in the true answer to the wh clause qua question, as a part of the meaning definition. In the complete definition (77), the denominator represents the presupposition:
On a standard notion of presupposition, presupposed material must follow from the Common Ground; at a minimum, the speaker must believe the proposition.
Thus if what 3 triggers a presupposition corresponding to the true answer, (75) carries the condition that the extent to which Baghdad is a big city follow from the Common Ground or at least the speaker's beliefs. That what 3 does trigger such a presupposition is evidenced by the different entailment relations in (78) and (79): (78a) seems to entail (78b) while (79a) does not seem to entail (79b).
(78) a. Jane does not know what a large city Baghdad is. b. I know what a large city Baghdad is.
(79) a. Jane does not know how big a city Baghdad is. b. I know how big a city Baghdad is.
In fact, Zanuttini and Portner (2003) propose that exclamative clauses generally contain a factivity functor causing the clause to presuppose every proposition in (a certain subset of) its denotation (following Karttunen's theory of questions). Thus the clauses "cannot be questions, because it would be pointless to ask a question where the answer is presupposed" (Zanuttini and Portner 2003: 50) .
And on an appropriate semantics for verbs like ask and wonder , committing the subject to the presuppositions of the complement clause, the impossibility of embedding what a clauses under these verbs will follow as well.
Note that this "factive" presupposition does not coincide with but is stronger than the presupposition coming from a factive predicate like know , reducing to the "diagonal" of the proposition, λi(ψ i ), in the wh case, the tautology. Rather, it corresponds to "superfactivity" in predicates like amazing (Saebø 2007: 196f.) .
The Variability of Degree wh Clauses
In the light of the discussion of how very and what a clauses in the previous two sections, the question naturally arises how the results reflect on normal degree how clauses, especially regarding Grimshaw's contention that (13), (14), or (80) is ambiguous, oscillating between an interrogative and an exclamative reading.
(80) how cold it is in Tromsø
Relative Reading and Positive Presupposition
First, we saw in Section 2.1 that some ordinary degree how clauses, those where the subject is an absolute measure, must be read in the relative sense, where the relevant measure is the deviation from the standard of comparison. Those how clauses must have this interpretation, involving the pos 0 functor, in order to make sense and not be tautologous. It seems only reasonable, then, to assume that any degree how clause can have this interpretation and that this is one source for the alleged ambiguity of clauses like (80). The two readings of (44), repeated here as (81), are (82) and (45), repeated here as (83): (81) how long the Nile is (82) λj length j (n) = length i (n) (83) λj length j (n)−S j (length) = length i (n)−S i (length)
Through the relative interpretation (83), the possibility of a nontrivial wh type presupposition arises -viz., that there is in fact a (positive) difference between the length and the standard, that is, the Nile is long, and it is cold in Tromsø.
And indeed, this seems part of the interpretation that Grimshaw had in mind.
Recall that Rett (2008a) introduces an operator eval designed, inter alia, to capture the "exclamative" reading by adding the content of this presupposition. If we include it, the interpretation of (81) is not just (83) but (84):
This interpretation can hardly be called a reading, though, in the sense that the presence or absence of the presupposition constitutes an ambiguity; as noted in section 2.2, the existential presuppositions frequently accompanying wh clauses are not stable but seem to rely on other factors than the wh words themselves. A presupposition which is somethimes there, sometimes not there, without any formal (overt or covert) correlate, is not a presupposition but just a presumption which the speaker must rely on extrinsic, contextual factors to get across. Still, it will in many cases actually come across, thus confirming Grimshaw's intuition that (13), repeated here as (85), can mean more or less the same as (86).
(85) Jane knows how long the Nile is.
(86) Jane knows that the Nile is notably long.
To a certain extent, the interpretation will depend on the embedding predicate. Thus a verb like realize or an adjective like aware will favour the relative reading and a positive presupposition, as will also an adjective like amazing.
A ≥ Interpretation
In addition to the possibility of a relative reading and the option of a positive presupposition, there is yet another semantic variable in degree wh clauses, not encountered so far: the ambivalence between a "greater than or equal to" (≥) and an "equal to" (=) reading, corresponding to the "at least" interpretation and the "exactly" interpretation of equatives, discussed by Rett (2008a: 124ff.) . (81) may have the interpretation (87) or (88) rather than (82) or (83):
Quite many predicates favour or force a ≥ reading. Clauses with causal verbs or prepositions, such as (89a), become too strong if the = interpretation is chosen, resulting in counterfactual paraphrases like (89b); the ≥ interpretation, on the other hand, licenses the intuitively correct counterfactual paraphrase (89c).
a. Lombard Street snakes from side to side due to how steep the hill is. b. Lombard Street would not snake from side to side if the hill were less or more steep. c. Lombard Street would not snake from side to side if the hill were less steep.
A similar effect can be observed when how clauses are complements of emotive (surprise) predicates; from (90a) (90b) follows, but not (90c). This asymmetry can only be accounted for on the inequality interpretation of the how clause.
(90) a. She was relieved when she saw how wide the sound was. b. She was relieved when she saw that the sound was not narrower than it was. c. She was relieved when she saw that the sound was not wider than it was.
Interestingly, in Groenendijk's and Stokhof's theory, intensions like (91) are not equivalence relations and so do not define partitions, hence they form deficient questions. Still, they assign to any world a proposition true in that world.
(91) λi λj length j (n) ≥ length i (n)
This they share, according to the hypothesis (19) in Section 1, repeated here as (92), with the intension of any wh clause used as an exclamation; thus they do not form deficient exclamations. Indeed, it may well be that all degree wh clauses used as exclamations select the ≥ interpretation.
It is at least not surprising if they do: Exclamations express that something is, in various ways, remarkable, and it seems that all emotive attitude predicates select the "at least" interpretation; this interpretation would also accord with the inherently scalar nature of exclamations noted by many scholars.
Superfactivity?
There is maybe the intuition that (93) sometimes entails that I, the speaker, know how cold it is in Tromsø, sometimes not. Yet to say that, say, (81) might and might not presuppose itself, i.e., (83), depending on the circumstances, would clearly be a mere stipulation, -unless one posits, as do Zanuttini and Portner (2003) (cf. Section 3.2), a formal correlate of the presupposition in the form of an optional covert (super-)factivity functor.
(93) Jane knows how cold it is in Tromsø.
(81) how long the Nile is (83) λj length j (n)−S j (length) = length i (n)−S i (length)
What could be noted is that a verb like realize, or appreciate, does seem to presuppose the proposition denoted by the embedded wh clause, and what could tentatively be assumed on that basis is that the verb know is polysemous and has this variant where it carries the same presupposition along.
Be that as it may; what seems clear is that impersonal emotive and 'surprise' attitudes like astonishing, marvellous do license the inference that the speaker knows the proposition, thus triggering a 'superfactive' presupposition, and, in addition, favour a relative degree reading with a positive degree presupposition, plus selecting the greater-than-or-equal-to interpretation.
Similarly, the exclamation speech act, which Gutiérrez-Rexach (1996) treats as a general emotive propositional attitude, will allow the inference that the speaker knows the proposition, thus triggering a 'superfactive' presupposition, and, in addition, favour a relative degree reading with a positive degree presupposition, plus selecting the greater-than-or-equal-to interpretation.
Summary
Summing up this subsection, there is support for the long-standing hypothesis that ordinary-looking degree how clauses are ambiguous; they are in two ways:
· an inequality, ≥ interpretation versus an equation, = interpretation.
On the other hand, there is no clear indication that they have a separate reading with a positive presupposition or a presupposition of the proposition itself.
Anyway, we can maintain that on any interpretation, degree how clauses denote propositions that are actually true.
Summary and Conclusions
The challenge has been to defend, in the face of potential counterevidence, the thesis that "interrogatives and exclamatives have basically the same denotations" (Gutiérrez-Rexach 1996: 154) . More precisely, assuming the wh theory of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) , it has been to defend EIC2:
Especially one class of facts might seem to provide counterevidence to this: Some wh clauses that can serve as exclamations cannot be used as questions or embedded under ask or wonder , although they can be embedded under a wide range of other predicates, including know . The problematic cases are:
-Degree how clauses intensified by very, enormously, or the like; -adnominal what a and adverbal how clauses used as degree wh clauses; -degree how clauses on an alleged exclamative interpretation.
Each case has been analysed in a way which leaves the basic semantics intact; one can indeed maintain the clause's denotation as a proposition actually true. The how very case has been seen to involve a relative measure, the difference to the standard of comparison; the observed presupposition (the Nile is very long) emerges as an existential presupposition necessary for the intensifier not to be redundant; and what makes these clauses useless as questions is the circumstance that the intensifier is itself an appropriate answer.
Adnominal what and adverbal how (as degree modifiers) have been argued to involve a mapping from predicates to measure functions. To account for the fact that these clauses cannot be used as questions, it has seemed necessary to appeal to a presupposition triggered by these wh items: the denoted proposition is presupposed, so that the putative question will answer itself.
The alleged exclamative reading of normal degree how clauses has been argued to derive from a combination of three factors: a relative measure interpretation, a ≥ interpretation (an option highly relevant for the other cases as well and in itself sufficient to render the clause deficient as a question), and the semantics of the embedding predicate (i.a., a reading of know in the sense of realize).
The focus of this paper has been on so-called embedded exclamatives, and no attention has been paid to those clauses that can barely be embedded and those items (such as Norwegian så, som or Swedish vad as degree modifiers) that seem to carry the speech act of exclamation on their sleeve. Does the fact that these clauses are restricted to this speech act raise doubts about EIC? I think not. The direct link between an item and the speech act can be motivated through the notion of hearer economy: while it is economical for the speaker to use the same words for the same semantics regardless of the speech act, for the hearer it is economical to receive as many clues to the act as possible. Besides, one should bear in mind that even those wh clauses that can both be embedded under a wide range of predicates and used as exclamations are distinguished by formal correlates when used as exclamations, in the form of intonation.
A defense of the EIC does not entail a defense of a theory of exclamations; especially EIC1 is compatible with several theories, building on Groenendijk's and Stokhof's question theory (e.g. Gutiérrez-Rexach 1996) or on Karttunen's (e.g. Zanuttini and Portner 2003) . But the analyses developed in the defense may be argued to obviate the need for exclamative-specific semantic features, such as the widening operation posited by Zanuttini and Portner (2003) .
On the other hand, the EIC is not compatible with a theory like Rett's (2008) , where wh clauses used as exclamations denote properties of degrees, a move motivated by the fact that not just any wh clause can act as an exclamation ("Fact 1" in Section 1). That is (indirect) counterevidence to the EIC of a kind that has not been addressed in this paper; my main aim has been to counter the threats to the EIC posed by the so-called "embedded exclamatives".
